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⚡ TL;DR
Sportico’s 2025 Top 100 shows the best-paid athletes earned $6.05bn, roughly $1.42bn of it off the field. Seven living athletes are Forbes billionaires, almost all through equity rather than salary: Michael Jordan ($3.8bn) on a Jordan Brand that turned over $7.3bn in Nike’s fiscal 2025, David Beckham ($1bn, May 2026) on a 26% Inter Miami stake, and Roger Federer, who entered the club in 2025 on a roughly 3% On stake and left it in August 2026 when the shares fell 19% in a day. Serena Williams runs a $111m fund; Kevin Durant’s 35V has made more than 100 investments.

The athlete as entrepreneur is a business model that describes a shift that took roughly forty years to mature: from players who were paid to wear a logo, to players who own the logo, the production company, the venture fund and sometimes the club. This article is part of the Sports Economy hub and complements our case studies on athlete-led brands from Air Jordan to Serena Ventures and our overview of how sportstech start-ups raise money and exit.

Disclaimer: This article is general information, not investment, legal or tax advice. Figures, rules and programme terms change frequently. Consult a qualified professional for your specific situation.
Key Takeaways

How much do elite athletes earn away from the field?
Sportico counted $1.42bn of off-field income inside the $6.05bn earned by the 100 best-paid athletes in 2025, about 23% of the total. For the Forbes 2025 top ten the off-field share was roughly a third, led by Stephen Curry ($100m), LeBron James ($85m) and Lionel Messi ($75m).

Which athletes have become billionaires, and how?
Forbes lists seven: Ion Tiriac, Michael Jordan ($3.8bn), Magic Johnson, Tiger Woods, LeBron James, Roger Federer and, from May 2026, David Beckham. In every case the decisive asset was equity, in a brand, a club, a media company or a listed firm, not playing salary.

What is the core of the model?
Convert attention into ownership early, hire operators who are not fans, and diversify away from the one company that made the athlete famous. Federer’s August 2026 slip out of the billionaire bracket, caused by a single On earnings miss, shows the concentration risk of the model.

What does the athlete as entrepreneur model actually look like?

It is a layered income stack: playing salary at the base, endorsement fees above it, then equity in brands, media and funds, and finally ownership of teams or operating companies. The upper layers compound after retirement; the lower layers stop when the career ends.

The model is a conversion problem. An athlete has a finite window of peak attention, usually eight to fifteen years, that brands and broadcasters will pay for. The traditional contract monetised it through salary and fees, which stop at retirement. The entrepreneur version uses the same window to acquire assets that keep producing afterwards: equity in place of cash, a production company, a venture fund, a stake in a club.

Forbes’ 2025 ranking of the highest-paid athletes shows the base layers at their largest. The top ten alone earned $1.4bn between May 2024 and May 2025, the biggest total since Forbes began the list in 1990. Cristiano Ronaldo led with $275m, of which $225m was on-field pay from Al-Nassr. Off the field, Stephen Curry earned $100m off the court against $56m on it, LeBron James $85m against $48.8m, Lionel Messi $75m against $60m, and Shohei Ohtani an extraordinary $100m off the field against $2.5m in deferred salary. Sportico’s Top 100 for calendar 2025 counted $6.05bn across eight sports and 28 countries, roughly $4.63bn in salary and prize money and $1.42bn off the field.

How did players move from endorsers to owners?

Three steps, over three decades: Michael Jordan’s royalty-based Nike deal in 1984 proved a player could own a revenue stream; Magic Johnson and later LeBron James showed equity and operating companies beat fees; and the 2015–2025 venture wave gave athletes a structure for investing other people’s money.

The first move was Jordan’s. Nike’s original 1984 offer gave him a share of revenue on a signature line, an arrangement that was unusual at the time and which turned into the Jordan Brand, a separate Nike division. According to Nike’s fiscal 2025 results as reported by Sportico, Jordan Brand revenue was $7.3bn, down 16% in a difficult year for Nike but still roughly double its 2020 level. Sportico estimates Jordan’s own income at about $300m a year, most of it Nike royalties. Forbes puts his net worth at $3.8bn, a figure that also reflects his 2023 sale of a majority stake in the Charlotte Hornets. Every athlete since has absorbed the lesson: a percentage of a growing product beats any fee.

The second move was from royalty to operating company. Magic Johnson built a holding company with stakes in cinemas, Starbucks franchises, insurance and the Los Angeles Dodgers; Forbes values him at $1.5bn. LeBron James and Maverick Carter founded SpringHill in 2007 as a production shop, merged it with Uninterrupted and The Robot Company in 2020 with backing from RedBird Capital, Fenway Sports Group, Nike and Epic Games, and in February 2025 merged it again with James Corden’s and Ben Winston’s Fulwell 73 to form Fulwell Entertainment. James, who Forbes lists at $1.2bn, is a partner in the merged entity rather than a client of it.

The third move was into fund management. Serena Williams spent most of a decade writing personal angel cheques, sixteen of which, by Fortune’s 2022 count, went into companies that later became unicorns, before raising a $111m first fund for Serena Ventures in 2022 with institutional limited partners including Norwest Venture Partners and CapitalG. Kevin Durant and Rich Kleiman’s Thirty Five Ventures has made more than 100 early-stage investments since 2016. Giannis Antetokounmpo launched Build Your Legacy Ventures in late 2024 as general partner.

Why do brands and investors pay for athlete equity?

Because the athlete brings distribution that is otherwise expensive to buy. A player with 20 million followers lowers customer-acquisition cost, lends credibility in a category and, in early-stage deals, improves a start-up’s chance of raising the next round.

The economics are easiest to see in a consumer brand. On, the Swiss running-shoe company, signed Roger Federer as a co-owner and product collaborator in 2019 rather than as a paid endorser. On listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 2021, and by August 2025 Forbes estimated Federer’s roughly 3% stake at more than $375m against a market capitalisation approaching $15bn, enough to lift his net worth to $1.1bn and make him the seventh athlete billionaire. For On, Federer cost shares rather than cash in the years it was still unprofitable.

The same logic applies in venture. Serena Ventures’ first-fund strategy, as described to Fortune in 2022, was 60% seed, 20% pre-seed and 20% Series A, with 78% of the portfolio founded by women or people of colour; the pitch to founders is that Williams takes pitches herself and promotes portfolio companies through her own channels.

Team ownership is the top of the stack. David Beckham’s 2007 LA Galaxy contract included an option to buy an MLS expansion franchise for a fixed $25m, exercised in 2014 for the club that became Inter Miami; Forbes reports he was $39m down on the project in 2016 and refused a $50m MLS offer to surrender the option. By May 2026, according to Forbes, his 26% stake in a club valued at a league-record $1.4bn was the largest component of a net worth that had just reached $1bn. The option was negotiated while he was still playing.

Athlete Net worth (Forbes) Decisive asset Model
Michael Jordan $3.8bn Jordan Brand royalties ($7.3bn revenue, Nike FY2025); Hornets sale 2023 Royalty on a product line
Ion Tiriac $2.3bn Banking, insurance, car dealerships in Romania Post-career conglomerate
Magic Johnson $1.5bn Magic Johnson Enterprises; Dodgers, Sparks, Commanders stakes Holding company and team equity
Tiger Woods $1.3bn Endorsements, TGR Design, TMRW Sports (TGL) Endorsement-to-venture
LeBron James $1.2bn Fulwell Entertainment (SpringHill), Fenway Sports Group stake, Nike lifetime deal Media operating company
David Beckham $1.0bn (May 2026) 26% of Inter Miami ($1.4bn valuation); 45% of DRJB Holdings after selling 55% to ABG (reported $250–269m) Club equity and licensing
Roger Federer $1.1bn (Aug 2025); $952m (Aug 2026) Roughly 3% of On Holding, plus Uniqlo, Rolex, Mercedes deals Equity-for-endorsement

What separates the athletes who build companies from those who only lend a name?

Four things recur: an operating partner who is not a friend from the locker room, a willingness to take equity instead of fees before the brand is proven, a narrow category where the athlete’s credibility is real, and patience, because the returns arrive five to ten years after the playing peak.

The partner comes first. Jordan had Nike’s Sonny Vaccaro and later a dedicated division; Beckham had Simon Fuller’s XIX Entertainment and then DRJB Holdings, founded with Victoria Beckham in 2014; James has had Maverick Carter from the beginning; Durant has Rich Kleiman; Williams hired Alison Rapaport Stillman from JPMorgan in 2018 to run her family office before the fund existed. The athlete supplies attention and category judgement; someone else runs the cap table, the hiring and the reporting.

The second marker is category discipline. Federer’s On is a running shoe; Jordan’s brand is basketball footwear; Beckham’s DRJB licensed grooming, fragrance and eyewear before adding the IM8 supplement brand, which Forbes reports turned over $92.4m in its 2025 financial year. Fortune reported in October 2025 that DRJB Holdings posted $92.3m revenue and $44.9m profit, up 44%, with Beckham drawing about $36.5m. Those are the economics of a licensing business, not a celebrity.

The third marker is timing. Beckham’s franchise option and Federer’s On shares were negotiated while the athlete was still an active asset to the counterparty. After retirement the leverage shifts and equity offers shrink.

On-field vs off-field earnings, Forbes 2025 ($m)Dark bar: salary and prize money. Light bar: endorsements, licensing, equity income.Ronaldo225 / 50Curry56 / 100Messi60 / 75James48.8 / 85Ohtani2.5 / 100Scale: 1px = $0.417m
Source: Forbes, The World’s Highest-Paid Athletes 2025 (May 2024–May 2025, pre-tax). Ohtani’s on-field figure reflects salary deferral in his Dodgers contract.

How large is the athlete venture-capital wave?

Large enough to be a recognised sub-sector. Serena Ventures manages a $111m institutional fund; 35V has more than 100 investments; Courtside Ventures, backed by Shaquille O’Neal and eight club ownership groups, has raised over $200m across three funds; Apex Capital’s athlete-backed fund closed roughly €50m in 2024 with Marcelo and Maro Itoje among its investors.

The vehicles differ in who holds the fiduciary duty. In the first type the athlete is a general partner managing outside money: Serena Ventures, Build Your Legacy Ventures, 35V. In the second, athletes are limited partners in a professionally run fund: Courtside Ventures’ $100m third fund, closed in January 2023, counts O’Neal and Larry Fitzgerald alongside the ownership groups of the Atlanta Hawks, Golden State Warriors, Atlético Madrid and LAFC. Apex Capital’s Elite Performance fund, launched in London in September 2023, had agreed 18 deals by April 2024, including TMRW Sports and Scoreplay. In the third, platforms such as Athletic Ventures pool more than 500 athlete investors into syndicates.

The returns picture is mostly unaudited. Williams’ sixteen personal unicorns came from a 2012–2021 cohort in a market that minted them freely; the 2022 fund has not reported distributions, and 35V’s portfolio is private. Investors should treat athlete funds as emerging managers whose distribution advantage helps portfolio companies raise, which is not the same as helping them exit.

💡 Pro Tip: If you are a founder offered an athlete investor, price the attention explicitly. Ask for a written commitment of posts, appearances or introductions per year and put it in a side letter, then compare the implied cost per impression with your paid-media rates. If the athlete’s team will not commit to anything measurable, treat the cheque as ordinary capital and price the round accordingly.

What does the model look like outside the United States?

Thinner, later and more football-shaped. European and Asian athletes have historically monetised through endorsement fees rather than equity, but the pattern is changing: Federer’s On stake, Beckham’s licensing holding company, Ronaldo’s CR7 brands and Lewis Hamilton’s minority stake in the Denver Broncos all show the ownership model crossing the Atlantic.

Cristiano Ronaldo is the clearest European case of an income stack built mostly on fees. His $275m in Forbes’ 2025 count is dominated by Al-Nassr salary; the off-field $50m comes from CR7-branded hotels, fragrance and a YouTube channel that passed 70 million subscribers within a year of its 2024 launch. The licensing is real but personal rather than institutional. Compare Beckham, whose 2022 sale of 55% of his brand business to Authentic Brands Group, for a reported $250–269m in cash and stock, converted a personal licensing book into a professionally managed asset with a buyer that owns Reebok and Sports Illustrated. Beckham kept 45% and still became Britain’s first athlete billionaire four years later.

In the Gulf and Asia the model is still forming. Saudi Pro League salaries have pushed Ronaldo and Benzema ($104m in 2025) to the top of the earnings tables without yet producing Saudi-based athlete enterprises. Japan’s Shohei Ohtani is the counter-example: his $100m off-field income comes from endorsements structured around his decision to defer $680m of his $700m Dodgers contract, a case study in athlete income and wealth management.

Türkiye sits earlier in the cycle. Süper Lig players at Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe command large domestic endorsement portfolios, but the ecosystem of operating partners, family offices and athlete-fund structures found in Los Angeles or London is only beginning to appear in Istanbul, which is the opening for the first advisers to professionalise athlete equity there.

What are the failure modes of the athlete-founder?

Concentration, over-extension and the retirement cliff. Federer lost roughly $52m of paper wealth and his billionaire status on a single On earnings day in August 2026; SpringHill was reported to have lost $28m in 2023 before merging; and most athlete-launched consumer brands do not survive their founder’s exit from the sport.

The Federer episode is the cleanest illustration of concentration. On’s second-quarter 2026 net sales of 850.4m Swiss francs grew 13% but missed expectations by about 28m francs; the shares fell about 19% on 11 August 2026, and Forbes cut Federer’s estimated net worth to $952.4m. Nothing had changed in his business; he held most of his equity wealth in one listed company because the stake came with a relationship rather than an allocation decision.

Over-extension is the media-company version. SpringHill raised at a reported $725m valuation in 2021; press reports in 2024 put its losses at roughly $28m for the prior year as the television market contracted. The 2025 merger with Fulwell 73 was partly a route to scale and to steadier live-event revenue, and the combined company cut UK staff within months.

The retirement cliff is the quietest failure. Endorsement income falls sharply when an athlete stops appearing on television weekly. Those who converted part of it into equity in advance hold assets indifferent to whether they still play; those who did not discover the window closed while they were in it. It is also why employer-run dual-career and transition programmes have become a recruiting channel.

⚠️ Risk: Equity-for-endorsement deals are usually illiquid, unhedged and tied to a single counterparty. An athlete with 60% of their net worth in one private brand has an undiversified portfolio with no exit date, and lock-ups often prevent selling even after a listing. Advisers should model the stake at a heavy discount and insist on diversification from salary income, because the equity cannot be rebalanced on demand.

What should founders and CFOs take from the athlete playbook?

Three transferable ideas: negotiate equity when your leverage is highest, not when you need the money; treat your audience as distribution and price it; and hire an operator early so the brand outlives the founder’s peak. The athlete model is, at bottom, a personal-brand company with a hard expiry date on its main input.

The first is timing. Beckham’s franchise option, Federer’s On stake and Jordan’s royalty line were all secured when the counterparty needed the athlete more than the reverse. CFOs negotiating with strategic partners should ask the Beckham question: what option on future value can be attached to this deal at no cost to the partner today?

The second is distribution. Start-ups accept athlete money for the reason On gave Federer shares: audience lowers customer-acquisition cost. A company that has built its own audience holds the same asset and should price it rather than give it away as goodwill. Our companion piece on what founders learn from athletes and coaches covers the behavioural side of the same comparison.

The third is succession. Every durable athlete enterprise in the table has a non-athlete running it. Founders who are the face of their brand should decide who runs the company in the year they are unavailable, before the question becomes urgent.

The athlete entrepreneur model is now mature enough to have its own billionaire list, its own fund structures and its own failure modes. The underlying arithmetic is simple: attention is temporary, equity is not, and the athletes who converted one into the other early are the ones whose wealth survived retirement. Explore more in our Sports & Entrepreneurship category, including athlete-led brand case studies and how sport learned to raise capital.

Frequently Asked Questions

Who was the first athlete billionaire?

By Forbes’ count, Romanian tennis and ice-hockey player Ion Tiriac, who built a banking, insurance and car-dealership group after retiring and reached billionaire status in 2007. Michael Jordan followed in 2014, mainly through Jordan Brand royalties and his Charlotte Hornets stake. Tiriac remains the only one of the seven whose fortune has nothing to do with his sporting fame.

How much of an elite athlete’s income comes from off-field sources?

For the 100 highest-paid athletes in 2025, Sportico counts about $1.42bn of off-field income inside $6.05bn total, roughly 23%. The share varies enormously by individual: Shohei Ohtani and Stephen Curry earned around $100m each off the field in Forbes’ 2025 count, while boxer Tyson Fury earned $140m in the ring and only about $6m outside it.

Do athlete venture funds perform well?

There is little audited evidence yet. Serena Williams’ personal angel portfolio produced sixteen unicorns by Fortune’s 2022 count, but her $111m institutional fund, closed in 2022, has not reported realised returns. Kevin Durant’s 35V and Courtside Ventures have publicised individual markups rather than fund-level results. Treat athlete funds as emerging managers whose main edge is distribution for portfolio companies.

Why did Roger Federer stop being a billionaire in 2026?

Because most of his equity wealth sits in a single listed company. On Holding reported second-quarter 2026 sales that missed expectations, its shares fell about 19% on 11 August 2026, and Forbes cut his estimated net worth to about $952m. His roughly 3% stake had pushed him over $1bn only a year earlier. Nothing changed in his own business; the concentration did the damage.

Last Updated: October 2026 · Reviewed by the Kurums Startup editorial team. Figures are as reported by the cited sources at the time of writing; market sizes, valuations, rights fees and programme terms change — verify before acting.

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