The three Gulf states have spent the past fifteen years buying, building and hosting sport as an instrument of economic diversification and foreign policy. Qatar’s World Cup sat inside a $138bn to $220bn infrastructure programme; Abu Dhabi’s City Football Group runs ten clubs on four continents from an 81% stake held by the ruling family’s vehicle; and Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, with about $900bn of assets, owns 85% of Newcastle United, bought 75% of four domestic clubs in 2023, put $1bn into DAZN, funded a $75m esports prize pool and will host a 15-stadium World Cup in 2034. In April 2026 the fund began to pull back, cutting LIV Golf and selling its 70% of Al Hilal to Kingdom Holding at a SAR 1.4bn valuation. The Gulf playbook is entering its second, more selective phase.
Gulf sports investors from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have reshaped the economics of football, golf, boxing, motorsport and esports since Qatar bought Paris Saint-Germain in 2011. This article is part of the Sports Economy hub and complements our studies of the Premier League as a British export and the United States franchise model, both of which Gulf capital has entered. It sets out what Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have each bought, why, what it has cost, and what the retrenchment of 2026 tells investors about where the money goes next.
Who are the Gulf’s sports investors?
Three sovereign vehicles: Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (about $900bn of assets in 2026), Qatar Sports Investments (owner of 85.9% of PSG) and Abu Dhabi United Group (81% of City Football Group). Each answers to a ruling family rather than to shareholders.
What have they bought?
Clubs (PSG, Manchester City, Newcastle United, four Saudi Pro League clubs, Braga, Girona, Palermo), leagues (LIV Golf, the Esports World Cup), media (a $1bn stake in DAZN, beIN Media), and events (the 2022 and 2034 World Cups, four Formula 1 races, WWE, boxing).
Is the spending slowing?
Yes, selectively. In April 2026 PIF withdrew funding from LIV Golf and sold 70% of Al Hilal to Kingdom Holding at a SAR 1.4bn ($373m) valuation, citing commitments to Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup. Capital is moving from trophy assets to infrastructure and domestic returns.
Who are the Gulf sports investors, and why do they spend?
Three sovereign vehicles, Saudi Arabia’s PIF, Qatar Sports Investments and Abu Dhabi United Group, spend for three reasons that reinforce each other: to diversify economies away from hydrocarbons by building tourism and entertainment sectors, to project national brands abroad through assets that command global attention, and to give young, fast-growing populations something to do at home. Sport is a tool of economic policy first and of image second.
The economics are explicit in each country’s plan. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 sets out the Quality of Life Program, under which the state built the Riyadh Sports Boulevard (a $23bn, 135 km² project due in 2027), the $9.8bn Qiddiya entertainment city with its Six Flags park and racing circuit, and the Riyadh Season winter festival that has run since 2019. Qatar’s National Vision 2030 used the 2022 World Cup as the deadline for a metro system, a deep-water port, motorways and the Lusail city district; the country’s own estimate of the programme was $138bn, and the widely cited $220bn figure includes everything built since the bid was won in 2010. Abu Dhabi’s Yas Island, home to the Formula 1 circuit since 2009, Ferrari World and the Etihad Arena, is a tourism district with a Grand Prix attached.
The soft-power argument is real but secondary. A Premier League title, a Champions League trophy (PSG’s first, in 2025) or Cristiano Ronaldo in a Saudi shirt generates attention that advertising cannot buy, and the governments use that attention to reposition their countries as destinations rather than as oil exporters. Critics call it sportswashing; the governments call it nation branding. For the purposes of a country playbook the point is that the spending is deliberate, state-directed and measured in GDP and visitor numbers rather than in club profits. Our pillar article on what a mega-event does for a host city sets out how those measurements usually turn out.
The domestic argument is the one most outsiders miss. Roughly two-thirds of Saudi citizens are under 35, women were admitted to stadiums only in 2018 and physical education for girls entered state schools in 2017. A professional league with Ronaldo, Benzema and Neymar, a national esports tournament and a WWE calendar are consumer products for a population that had very few. The sports economy is partly an exercise in building a domestic leisure market from scratch.
What has Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund bought?
Almost everything that was for sale. Since 2021 PIF has acquired 85% of Newcastle United for £305m, 75% of Al Hilal, Al Nassr, Al Ittihad and Al Ahli, the LIV Golf league, a stake of under 5% in DAZN for $1bn through its SURJ Sports Investment arm, the Esports World Cup Foundation and a 93% stake in Electronic Arts via a $55bn buyout completed in August 2026.
The fund itself is the largest sports investor in the world by a wide margin. PIF reported assets of about $900bn in May 2026, revenue above $120bn and net income above $17bn for 2025. Its sports holdings are small relative to that balance sheet but large relative to the industry: the Newcastle purchase in October 2021 came with “legally binding assurances” to the Premier League that the Saudi state would not control the club; the June 2023 purchase of 75% of the four largest Pro League clubs was followed by a transfer window in which the league spent close to $1bn by most press estimates, including €90m for Neymar at Al Hilal and the contracts that brought Karim Benzema, Riyad Mahrez, Rúben Neves and Sadio Mané to the Gulf. Al Hilal beat Manchester City at the 2025 Club World Cup, a tournament whose $1bn prize fund and €1bn global rights deal with DAZN were both, in different ways, underwritten by Saudi money.
The golf venture has been the most expensive and the least successful. LIV Golf, launched in 2022 with $2bn of PIF backing, pulled the PGA Tour into a framework agreement in June 2023 that was never completed; the Tour instead raised $1.5bn from the Fenway-led Strategic Sports Group in January 2024. By April 2026 PIF had withdrawn funding, and in May 2026 Bloomberg reported LIV was seeking new investors and weighing a US bankruptcy filing. In the same month the fund sold 70% of Al Hilal, the country’s most successful club, to Kingdom Holding Company, controlled by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, at a valuation of SAR 1.4bn (about $373m). PIF framed both decisions as redeploying capital toward domestic returns and the obligations of Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup.
The media and gaming investments are the ones with a commercial thesis. The DAZN stake gave the fund a seat inside the platform that holds Club World Cup, boxing, Serie A, LaLiga and, through Foxtel, Australian sports rights; the EA buyout, completed in August 2026, makes the Saudi state the owner of the FIFA/EA Sports FC franchise and much of the world’s sports-gaming intellectual property; and the Esports World Cup in Riyadh carried a record $75m prize pool in 2026, up from $62.5m in 2024. Our article on streaming entrants in sport covers DAZN’s position in detail.
| Investor (state) | Club and league assets | Events and media | Key figures | 2025-26 direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Public Investment Fund (Saudi Arabia) | Newcastle United 85%; Al Nassr, Al Ittihad, Al Ahli 75%; Al Hilal sold Apr 2026; LIV Golf (funding withdrawn) | 2034 World Cup (15 stadiums); Esports World Cup ($75m pool); Jeddah F1; WWE; DAZN stake ($1bn); EA ($55bn) | ~$900bn AUM; Al Hilal valued SAR 1.4bn; Newcastle bought £305m | Retrenching from trophy assets; focus on 2034, Expo 2030, domestic returns |
| Qatar Sports Investments / state (Qatar) | PSG 85.9% (Arctos 12.5%); Braga 21.67%; Eupen (agreed Dec 2025) | 2022 World Cup; beIN Media; Qatar F1 and MotoGP; 2027 FIBA World Cup; 2030 Asian Games; 2036 Olympic bid | PSG revenue €837m (4th in world); Forbes value ~€4bn; World Cup programme $138bn-$220bn | Consolidating: Champions League won 2025, Olympic bid, new PSG stadium |
| Abu Dhabi United Group and Dubai (UAE) | City Football Group 81% (Silver Lake 18%): Manchester City, NYCFC, Girona, Palermo, Bahia and 5 more | Abu Dhabi F1 finale; UFC Abu Dhabi; NBA Abu Dhabi Games; Dubai tennis and golf; ILT20 cricket; Emirates and Etihad sponsorships | Man City revenue €829m (6th); 10 clubs in CFG; Silver Lake invested $500m in 2019 | Pruning the network (Mumbai, Yokohama exited); airline sponsorship model stable |
How does Qatar’s model differ from Saudi Arabia’s?
Qatar built first and bought selectively. Its spending was concentrated on a single mega-event, the 2022 World Cup, one flagship club, Paris Saint-Germain, and one media company, beIN. It has not tried to build a domestic league of global standing and is now bidding for the 2036 Olympics on the infrastructure it already owns.
PSG is the template for a state-owned club done patiently. Qatar Sports Investments bought 70% in June 2011 and the rest in 2012; fourteen years and several billion euros of losses later the club earned €837m in 2024/25 (fourth in Deloitte’s 2026 Money League), won its first Champions League in 2025, and sold 12.5% to the US fund Arctos Partners at a valuation reported around €4bn, which Forbes broadly confirms. The club now generates revenue that would justify a private owner, which is the test every state-owned club eventually faces. The next phase is a new stadium: the club’s Campus PSG in Poissy was built in 2023 and the Parc des Princes, which the city of Paris refused to sell, drew an average 47,639 in 2024/25.
The World Cup economics are harder to judge. Qatar’s eight stadiums hosted 3.4 million spectators at an average of 53,191; the tournament’s $440m prize fund was FIFA’s, not Qatar’s. The state’s own figure for the wider programme was $138bn, most of it transport, housing and utilities that Doha would have needed regardless. Legacy is mixed: upper tiers of several stadiums were designed to be removed and donated, but Stadium 974, meant to be dismantled entirely, still stood unused in late 2024. Our analysis of the economics of the 2026 World Cup and the road to 2034 compares the Qatari build with the North American approach of using existing venues.
beIN Media is the asset that ties Qatar’s model together. Chaired by Nasser Al-Khelaifi, who also chairs PSG and the European Club Association, beIN holds Premier League, Champions League, LaLiga and Süper Lig rights across the Middle East and North Africa and, through beIN Sports Türkiye, is the domestic broadcaster of Turkish football. The Istanbul clubs’ broadcast income, in other words, is paid by Doha. For a small state, owning the distribution channel for the region’s sport has proved more durable than owning the teams.
What is the UAE’s playbook, and why is it the most commercial?
Abu Dhabi and Dubai run sport as a business line rather than a state project. City Football Group is a multi-club holding company with outside shareholders, Emirates and Etihad are the world’s largest airline sports sponsors, and Dubai sells itself as an events and training destination. The UAE model is the closest of the three to a conventional investment portfolio.
City Football Group is the clearest example. Abu Dhabi United Group bought Manchester City in 2008 and in 2019 sold 18% of the holding company to the US private equity firm Silver Lake for $500m, with 1% held by Chinese investors; the ruling-family vehicle retains 81%. CFG now owns ten clubs: Manchester City, New York City FC, Melbourne City, Montevideo City Torque, Girona, Shenzhen Peng City, Lommel, Troyes, Palermo and Bahia. It has also begun to prune, selling Mumbai City in December 2025 and its Yokohama F. Marinos shares to Nissan in June 2026. Manchester City’s revenue of €829m in 2024/25 makes it the sixth-richest club in the world even in a season when revenue fell 1%, and the group’s model of shared scouting, data and coaching across continents is what every other multi-club owner has copied. Our pillar on club valuations and multi-club ownership traces that lineage.
The airline sponsorships are the UAE’s other sports export. Emirates sponsors Arsenal’s stadium and shirt, Real Madrid, AC Milan, Benfica, Lyon and the Emirates FA Cup, along with the rugby, cricket and tennis properties that carry its name; Etihad holds the naming rights to Manchester City’s stadium and campus. Those contracts function as route marketing for Dubai and Abu Dhabi as hubs, which is why Turkish Airlines, the Istanbul hub’s carrier, has followed the same logic with the EuroLeague, which it has title-sponsored since 2010, and with football and tennis sponsorships across Europe.
Events complete the picture. Abu Dhabi hosts the season-ending Formula 1 Grand Prix at Yas Marina, UFC fight cards on Yas Island under a long-term agreement, the NBA’s Abu Dhabi Games each October, the ADCC submission-grappling world championship and the DP World Tour Championship in Dubai, whose 2013 edition was estimated to bring $44m of gross economic benefit to the emirate. Dubai’s winter calendar of tennis, golf, horse racing (the Dubai World Cup) and the ILT20 cricket franchise league fills hotels in the season when Europe is cold. The UAE did not need to buy a World Cup; it built a destination and let the events come.
What has the Gulf money done to global sport?
It has reset prices and shifted power. Gulf capital inflated the transfer market in 2023, created a rival golf tour, pulled the 2034 World Cup to a single bidder, underwrote the first $1bn Club World Cup through DAZN and put Saudi and Emirati names on the shirts, stadiums and broadcast graphics of Europe’s biggest clubs.
In football the clearest effect is on the player market. The Saudi Pro League’s 2023 window, in which clubs led by the four PIF-owned sides spent close to $1bn, gave European clubs a new buyer for ageing stars and inflated the wages those stars could command. The league’s foreign-player quota (ten per squad, eight on a matchday) and its MENA broadcast deal with Thmanyah, running to 2031, give it the structure of a serious league; average attendance of roughly 8,000 in 2023/24 shows it does not yet have the audience. The 2025 sale of Al Kholood to the Harburg Group, the first Saudi club wholly owned by foreign investors, and the Al Hilal sale to Kingdom Holding in 2026 mark the start of the privatisation the fund always said was the goal.
In governance the effect is on who sets the rules. Nasser Al-Khelaifi chairs the European Club Association; the Saudi federation’s bid for 2034 was the only one FIFA received; and the April 2026 statement by the UN human rights office urging an end to the kafala labour system, together with UEFA’s threat in July 2026 of a European boycott over FIFA’s commercial proposals, shows that the political cost is being paid in public. The Gulf states have bought influence as well as assets, and the influence is now contested.
In media and events the effect is competition for the leagues themselves. Spanish and Italian cup finals are played in Riyadh; WWE’s 2026 Royal Rumble was held there; boxing’s biggest heavyweight fights since 2023 have taken place in Saudi Arabia under the Riyadh Season banner; and Formula 1 now has Bahrain, Jeddah, Qatar and Abu Dhabi on its calendar, although only two of them appear on the 2026 schedule. Each event is a fee paid by the state to a rights holder, and each fee raises the price the rights holder can charge elsewhere. Our guide to the sports sponsorship market quantifies how much of global sponsorship growth since 2021 has come from Gulf brands such as Aramco, Qatar Airways, Emirates, Visit Saudi and Riyadh Air.
What does the 2034 World Cup mean for the Saudi sports economy?
It is the largest single commitment in the playbook: 15 stadiums in five cities, ten of them new, including the 92,760-seat King Salman International Stadium in Riyadh and a 46,010-seat venue in NEOM, confirmed by FIFA on 11 December 2024 after Saudi Arabia was the sole bidder. No official cost estimate has been published.
The programme explains the 2026 retrenchment. A fund that must deliver ten stadiums, the transport to connect five host cities and the Expo 2030 site in Riyadh ($7.8bn on the government’s own figure) by the early 2030s has less appetite for a loss-making golf tour or for carrying four football clubs on its balance sheet. The logic is the same one Qatar followed between 2010 and 2022: concentrate state capital on infrastructure that outlives the event, and let clubs and leagues find commercial or private owners.
The hosting economics will follow the usual pattern. FIFA, not Saudi Arabia, will collect the broadcast, sponsorship and ticket revenue, which FIFA budgeted at roughly $11bn for the 2023-26 cycle; the host receives tourism, construction employment and global attention, and pays for the stadiums. The lesson from Qatar is that the visible cost (stadiums) is a small fraction of the real programme (everything else), and the lesson from Germany’s Euro 2024, as our Germany playbook notes, is that a host with existing venues spends an order of magnitude less. Saudi Arabia has chosen the Qatar route, at roughly twice the scale.
What the World Cup cannot do is create a league. The Saudi Pro League will have world-class stadiums in 2034, but attendance, local commercial revenue and private ownership have to be built in the eight years before then. The sale of Al Hilal to a Saudi conglomerate is the first test of whether the domestic private sector will pay for what the state has built. If it does, Saudi Arabia will have done in two decades what Türkiye’s big three clubs did over a century: created privately owned, member-rooted clubs with a national audience. If it does not, the stadiums will belong to the state and the clubs to its budget.
What can other countries learn from the Gulf playbook?
Three things. State money can buy global attention quickly and build infrastructure that private capital would not fund; it cannot buy an audience, a competitive league or a commercial return on a timetable; and the exit, through privatisation or outside co-investors, has to be designed in from the start.
The first lesson applies to any government with a diversification mandate. Qatar’s World Cup and Abu Dhabi’s Yas Island show that a sports programme can anchor a transport and tourism build that the country needed anyway, and that the events put a date on projects that would otherwise drift. The cost is that the headline number (the $220bn Qatar figure) becomes the public’s measure of the event, however little of it the event itself consumed.
The second lesson is about patience. PSG took fourteen years, several billion euros and a tolerant regulator to become a club that earns €837m and wins the Champions League; Manchester City took a similar period and a decade of legal argument with the Premier League over financial rules. The Saudi Pro League tried to compress that into three seasons and discovered that crowds of 8,000 do not change because Ronaldo is on the pitch. Audiences are built by competition, local identity and time, which no sovereign fund can shorten.
The third lesson is the most useful for investors. The Gulf states that brought in outside capital early, Abu Dhabi with Silver Lake in 2019 and Qatar with Arctos in 2023, created a market price for their assets and a path to liquidity. Saudi Arabia is doing so now, with Kingdom Holding at Al Hilal, foreign owners at Al Kholood and DAZN, EA and the Esports World Cup as commercial platforms rather than vanity projects. Countries such as Türkiye, which has used state banks and public infrastructure to support clubs without ever building an exit, might note that a state sports strategy without a privatisation plan is a permanent subsidy. Our article on sport as an asset class sets out what the returns look like when the exit works.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much has Saudi Arabia invested in sport?
No official total exists. Documented commitments by the Public Investment Fund include £305m for Newcastle United in 2021, roughly $2bn of initial LIV Golf backing, a $1bn stake in DAZN in 2025, the 2023 purchase of 75% of four Pro League clubs followed by a transfer window of close to $1bn, a $75m Esports World Cup prize pool in 2026 and the $55bn Electronic Arts buyout completed in August 2026, which is a gaming rather than a sports transaction. The 2034 World Cup’s 15 stadiums have no published cost.
Why did PIF sell Al Hilal in 2026?
PIF announced on 16 April 2026 that it was selling its 70% stake in Al Hilal to Kingdom Holding Company, the conglomerate controlled by Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, in a deal valuing the club at SAR 1.4bn (about $373m). The fund said the sale supported its strategy of maximising returns and redeploying capital domestically, and it came in the same month that PIF withdrew funding from LIV Golf while citing its commitments to Expo 2030 and the 2034 World Cup.
Who owns Paris Saint-Germain and Manchester City?
Qatar Sports Investments, a vehicle of the Qatari state, holds 85.9% of PSG, with the US fund Arctos Partners holding 12.5% since 2023. Manchester City is wholly owned by City Football Group, which is 81% owned by Abu Dhabi United Group (the vehicle of Sheikh Mansour of the Abu Dhabi ruling family), 18% by the US private equity firm Silver Lake and 1% by Chinese investors. CFG owns or part-owns nine other clubs across Europe, the Americas, Asia and Australia.
What did the 2022 World Cup cost Qatar?
It depends what is counted. Qatari officials put the cost of the tournament itself at about $8bn and the wider programme of stadiums, metro, port, roads and housing built since the 2010 award at $138bn; the widely cited $220bn figure includes all national infrastructure spending over that period. The eight stadiums hosted 3.4 million spectators, and several were designed to shrink or be dismantled afterwards, with mixed results.
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