Toronto hosts 1,073 mining issuers across the TSX and TSXV with a combined market value above C$1.1 trillion, and those companies raised about C$16 billion of equity in 2025 alone. Barrick Mining, the city’s historic gold champion, spent 2025 settling a two-year dispute with Mali’s junta for roughly US$430 million, changing its name and ticker, losing its long-time CEO and preparing an IPO of its North American assets. Agnico Eagle, run from the same city, became the most valuable gold producer on earth by owning mines in Canada, Finland and Australia and compounding a record US$1.34 billion of free cash flow in a single quarter. The contrast between the two explains why the mining world still books its flights to PDAC every March.
Toronto is the mining capital of the world not because Ontario has the richest rocks, but because it has the deepest pool of specialist capital, the most permissive junior listing venue and a tax device, the flow-through share, that no other country copies at scale. The two largest gold companies run from the city tell the story from opposite ends: Barrick Mining is a global empire that has spent two years fighting an African government and restructuring itself, while Agnico Eagle is a regional specialist that stayed close to home and was rewarded with the sector’s highest valuation. This article explains how the Toronto mining ecosystem works, what happened at Barrick in 2025 and 2026, why Agnico overtook its larger rivals, and what founders and investors can take from both. It is part of the Canada Company Stories hub.
Why does Toronto dominate mining finance?
Because the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange list nearly half the world’s public mining companies, the city concentrates mining lawyers, geologists, analysts and brokers, and Canada’s flow-through share regime channels retail tax savings directly into exploration drilling.
What happened to Barrick in 2025?
Barrick Gold became Barrick Mining, swapped its NYSE ticker from GOLD to B, lost control of its Loulo-Gounkoto complex in Mali for six months, took a US$1.04 billion charge, saw CEO Mark Bristow leave in September and settled with Bamako in November for a payment reported at around US$430 million.
How did Agnico Eagle become the top gold stock?
By keeping almost all production in Canada, Finland, Australia and Mexico, running the lowest all-in sustaining cost among the majors (US$1,459 per ounce in Q2 2026) and returning cash: it held US$3.3 billion of net cash and earned an A- credit rating from Fitch in April 2026.
Why is Toronto called the mining capital of the world?
Toronto earns the title through listings and money rather than mines. According to TMX Group, 1,073 mining issuers were listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and the TSX Venture Exchange at the end of 2025, with a combined market capitalisation above C$1.1 trillion; the two exchanges describe themselves as home to nearly half of the world’s public mining companies. Those issuers completed 1,429 equity financings in 2025 and raised about C$16 billion, a figure that no other exchange group matched for the sector.
The reason the number is so large is structural. The TSX Venture Exchange is built for companies that own nothing but a drill permit and a geological theory. It accepts listings at market values that London’s AIM or the ASX would consider too small, and its Capital Pool Company programme lets shell companies list first and find a project afterwards. Around that venue sits a service industry of several thousand people on Bay Street and King Street West: securities lawyers at firms that specialise in mining prospectuses, technical consultants who sign off on the NI 43-101 resource reports that every listed explorer must publish, boutique brokers that underwrite C$5 million placements, and the analyst teams at the Big Six banks, which are described in the article on Canada’s banking oligopoly.
The city’s position is reinforced every March by the Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada convention. PDAC 2026, held from 1 to 4 March at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre, drew more than 27,000 attendees from over 125 countries, with more than 1,300 exhibitors and some 700 presenters. TMX rang market bells with national mining delegations from Australia, Latin America and North America, and mines ministers from dozens of producing countries held their annual summit on the sidelines. The convention began in 1932 as a meeting of prospectors; it is now the week in which the global industry sets its financing calendar.
How do flow-through shares turn tax relief into drill holes?
Flow-through shares let an exploration company renounce its Canadian exploration expenses to the investors who bought the shares, so that those individuals deduct the spending from their own taxable income as if they had drilled the holes themselves. The company gets equity capital at a premium to its market price; the investor gets a deduction plus, on top of it, a federal tax credit. Because the deduction is personal, the instrument pulls money from high-income Canadians into junior mining in a way that has no close equivalent in the United States, Britain or Australia.
The federal Budget delivered on 4 November 2025 confirmed that the 15 per cent Mineral Exploration Tax Credit, which had technically lapsed on 31 March 2025, would run until 31 March 2027. It also expanded the 30 per cent Critical Mineral Exploration Tax Credit, in place since 2022 for lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, copper, rare earths and uranium among others, to twelve additional minerals including tungsten, tin, manganese, niobium, germanium and molybdenum, for flow-through agreements entered into after Budget day and before the end of March 2027. Provinces layer their own credits on top; a Québec or British Columbia resident subscribing to a critical-minerals flow-through placement can recover a large share of the subscription price in the first year.
The system has obvious costs. It subsidises drilling regardless of result, it attracts promoters as well as geologists, and the “flow-through premium” that companies charge for the paper can mask a weak underlying share price. But it is the single most important reason that Canada’s junior sector survived the 2013 to 2019 bear market in better shape than its Australian cousin, and why the TSXV still produced more mining financings in 2025 than the rest of the world combined. The programme sits alongside the broader package of critical-minerals subsidies covered in Canada’s critical minerals strategy.
What went wrong for Barrick in Mali?
Barrick lost control of its most important African mine for most of 2025 because it refused to accept the terms of Mali’s 2023 mining code. The Loulo-Gounkoto complex in western Mali is the country’s largest gold operation and accounted for about 15 per cent of Barrick’s attributable output in 2024. From late 2024 the military government in Bamako escalated a dispute over back taxes and the new code, which raises the state’s permitted stake in mining projects to 35 per cent from 20 per cent, by suspending gold shipments, seizing gold stock at the site, detaining four Barrick employees and issuing an arrest warrant for CEO Mark Bristow.
In June 2025 a Malian judge placed the complex under provisional administration for six months, a step that forced Barrick to book a US$1.04 billion charge in its second quarter and to remove Loulo-Gounkoto from 2025 production guidance. Barrick had already filed for arbitration at the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in December 2024. The standoff cost the company the mine’s cash flow for most of a year at a time when gold was climbing past US$3,500 an ounce.
A settlement was announced in late November 2025. Mali agreed to drop legal proceedings against Barrick’s local subsidiaries, release the four detained staff and return the complex to Barrick’s control; a Malian judge subsequently ordered the return of the seized gold. Barrick, in turn, agreed to withdraw its ICSID arbitration and to pay the state a sum that Bloomberg put at 244 billion CFA francs, or roughly US$430 million to US$436 million, close to the back-tax claim the government had originally made. Control formally returned in December 2025, with a gradual restart that began with retraining the workforce and contractors. By August 2026 the company said the ramp-up was running ahead of schedule. The regulatory terms, including how the 2023 code applies and the renewal of the Loulo permit that expired in February 2026, were still being clarified at the time of writing.
Why did Barrick change its name, its ticker and its CEO?
Barrick’s shareholders approved the renaming of Barrick Gold Corporation to Barrick Mining Corporation at the annual meeting in May 2025, and the company began trading under the NYSE ticker “B” instead of “GOLD” on 9 May 2025; the Toronto ticker stayed ABX. Management’s explanation was that the group was building a copper business, led by the Lumwana expansion in Zambia and the Reko Diq copper-gold project in Pakistan, large enough that a gold-only name no longer described it. Copper output rose 13 per cent to 220,000 tonnes in 2025 against gold output that fell 17 per cent to 3.26 million ounces.
The leadership change came four months later. On 29 September 2025 the board announced that Mark Bristow, chief executive since the 2019 merger with Randgold Resources that he had led, was stepping down with immediate effect. Mark Hill, a Barrick veteran since 2006 who had run the Latin America and Asia Pacific operations, was appointed group chief operating officer and interim CEO. Chairman John Thornton said the board would seek a permanent chief executive and was focused on improving performance. Hill was subsequently confirmed in the role and oversaw the renewed talks with Bamako that produced the November settlement.
The portfolio was simplified at the same time. Barrick agreed to sell Hemlo, its only Canadian mine, to Carcetti Capital for up to US$1.09 billion, and completed that sale and the sale of Tongon in Côte d’Ivoire in the fourth quarter of 2025. Its 50 per cent interest in Donlin in Alaska and the Alturas project in Chile were also sold, bringing 2025 proceeds from non-core disposals to about US$2.6 billion. A company that once sought to own gold mines everywhere was reshaping itself around six Tier One gold assets, a copper growth pipeline and, as the next section describes, a separate North American listing.
What does Barrick’s North American IPO plan involve?
Barrick intends to list a minority stake in a new company holding its North American gold assets by the end of 2026. The vehicle would own Barrick’s 61.5 per cent interest in and operatorship of Nevada Gold Mines, the joint venture with Newmont that is the largest gold-mining complex in the world; the Pueblo Viejo mine in the Dominican Republic; the Fourmile discovery in Nevada; and North American exploration ground. Mark Hill is to become chief executive of the new company once it is separated.
The plan was unlocked by a settlement with Newmont announced alongside second-quarter results on 10 August 2026. Both partners agreed to contribute properties that had been excluded from the original joint venture, with Fourmile coming from Barrick and the Mike and Fiberline deposits from Newmont, expanding the Nevada complex to nearly 100 million ounces of gold. Newmont also agreed to pay Barrick a US$1.95 billion cash top-up within 30 days, to resolve all outstanding disputes between the partners and to consent to the IPO. Hill called it a historic agreement, and the market treated it as the removal of the last structural obstacle to the listing.
The quarter that accompanied the announcement showed why the timing suited Barrick. Gold production of 796,000 ounces was 11 per cent higher than the first quarter and above the top of guidance. Revenue rose 44 per cent year on year to US$5.29 billion at a realised gold price of US$4,417 an ounce, net earnings rose 50 per cent to US$1.22 billion, and the company bought back US$1.21 billion of shares in the quarter under a US$3 billion programme while holding net cash of US$1.25 billion. Full-year 2026 guidance of 2.9 to 3.25 million ounces of gold at an all-in sustaining cost of US$1,760 to US$1,950 per ounce was unchanged, although attributable capital spending was trimmed to US$3.8 to 4.2 billion, mainly because of lower spending at Reko Diq, where management had begun reviewing the project after a rise in security incidents.
How did Agnico Eagle become the world’s most valuable gold miner?
Agnico Eagle reached the top of the gold sector by doing almost the opposite of Barrick. Founded in 1957 and run from Toronto, the company spent two decades building or buying mines in jurisdictions that investors trust: Québec’s Abitibi belt, Nunavut, Ontario, Finland, Australia and Mexico. The 2022 merger with Kirkland Lake Gold brought Detour Lake in Ontario and Fosterville in Australia; the 2023 purchase of Yamana’s Canadian assets gave it full ownership of Canadian Malartic, Canada’s largest gold mine. By May 2025 Bloomberg reported that Agnico’s market value of about US$59 billion was level with Newmont’s, making it the most valuable gold-focused producer and one of the few large miners whose shares had outperformed the gold price itself.
The second quarter of 2026 showed the model at full stretch. Agnico produced 855,816 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of US$1,459 an ounce and realised US$4,483 an ounce, generating net income of US$1.6 billion, operating cash flow of US$2.14 billion and record free cash flow of US$1.34 billion. Detour Lake alone contributed 207,279 ounces. The company ended June with US$3.46 billion of cash against US$197 million of debt, a net cash position of US$3.27 billion that earned it an A- rating from Fitch in April 2026. It returned a record US$625 million to shareholders in the quarter through a US$0.45 quarterly dividend and US$400 million of buybacks, and it targets returning about 40 per cent of annual free cash flow.
Chief executive Ammar Al-Joundi has also used the cash to consolidate a second home district. In the second quarter of 2026 Agnico bought B2Gold’s 70 per cent of the FinGold joint venture for US$325 million, acquired the remainder of Aurion Resources for C$474.5 million and closed the US$1.69 billion all-share purchase of Rupert Resources, giving it control of the Ikkari discovery next to its Kittilä mine in Finnish Lapland. The growth pipeline is similarly domestic: a positive investment decision in May 2026 on Hope Bay in Nunavut, targeting 400,000 to 435,000 ounces a year over eleven years; the Odyssey underground mine at Malartic, with first production through the new shaft due in mid-2027; the Detour Lake underground project; and Upper Beaver in Ontario.
| Metric (US$) | Barrick Mining FY2025 | Barrick Q2 2026 | Agnico Eagle Q2 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gold production | 3.26 million oz (-17%) | 796,000 oz | 855,816 oz |
| All-in sustaining cost | $1,637/oz | $1,866/oz | $1,459/oz |
| Realised gold price | $3,501/oz | $4,417/oz | $4,483/oz |
| Revenue | $16.96bn | $5.29bn | about $3.7bn (implied) |
| Net earnings | $4.99bn | $1.22bn | $1.60bn |
| Free cash flow | $3.87bn | $515m | $1.34bn (record) |
| Net cash at period end | $2.00bn | $1.25bn | $3.27bn |
| Shareholder returns | $2.39bn (record) | $1.21bn buyback + $0.175 dividend | $625m (record) |
What does the Barrick-Agnico contrast say about jurisdiction risk?
The two companies’ 2025 and 2026 numbers are a controlled experiment in where a gold miner chooses to dig. Barrick realised a lower gold price than Agnico in the second quarter of 2026, spent US$400 more per ounce to produce it, and generated less than half the free cash flow from a comparable volume of metal. Part of the gap is geology, but most of it is geography: Barrick’s portfolio runs through Mali, Tanzania, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Zambia and the Dominican Republic, each of which has renegotiated terms with the company in the past decade, whereas Agnico’s largest exposure to political risk is a provincial election in Québec.
Investors have priced that difference consistently. Paulson & Co., which took its Agnico stake when the company was worth about US$7.9 billion, told Bloomberg in 2025 that it preferred the company precisely because it operated in Canada and Australia, and that it had sold its Barrick holding in 2022. Sixteen of the analysts covering Agnico rated it outperform at the time. Barrick’s North American IPO is, in effect, an admission that the market will pay a Canadian multiple for Nevada and the Dominican Republic if they are separated from the African and Asian assets that drag on the group’s rating.
The lesson is not that frontier mining is always wrong. Loulo-Gounkoto has been one of the most profitable gold mines in the world for twenty years, and Barrick’s 2025 return on the asset even after a year’s interruption would satisfy most investors. It is that the discount applied to such assets widens sharply in a strong gold market, when the safe producers have plenty of cash flow of their own and no need to accept political risk to grow. That is the environment of 2026, and it is why a Toronto company that never left Canada now outranks the one that went everywhere.
How does the TSX ecosystem actually make money for the city?
Toronto’s mining economy is a fee economy, and most of the fees are earned before a single ounce is produced. A C$10 million TSXV placement typically pays six to seven per cent in agent commissions plus broker warrants, legal fees at two firms, a technical report from an engineering consultancy, a transfer agent and the exchange’s own listing and sustaining fees. Multiply that by 1,429 financings in a year and the service industry around the exchange is a business of several billion dollars in its own right.
The larger money is at the top of the pyramid. Barrick’s and Agnico’s buyback programmes, Agnico’s US$1.69 billion Rupert acquisition, the C$474.5 million Aurion purchase and Barrick’s asset disposals of US$2.6 billion in 2025 were all advised and executed from Toronto by the investment-banking arms of the Big Six and by global banks that keep metals teams in the city because the clients are there. Pension funds such as the ones profiled in the article on CPP Investments and the Maple Eight are the anchor holders of the senior producers, and Brookfield’s infrastructure and transition funds have become financiers of mine-related power and processing.
PDAC captures the social side of the same machine. Deals are initiated at the Fairmont Royal York bar and closed in the exhibit hall, mines ministers from Latin America and Africa use the week to pitch their jurisdictions to Canadian capital, and the exchange’s Australian delegation visits Toronto because the TSX remains the venue of choice for a dual listing. The city’s claim to the title rests on this concentration rather than on any single company, which is why Barrick’s partial retreat from Toronto’s gold heritage has not diminished it.
What can founders and investors learn from Barrick and Agnico?
The first lesson is that portfolio quality and jurisdiction matter more than scale. Barrick produced more gold than Agnico in 2025 and still ended up worth less, because the market applies a jurisdictional discount that no amount of operational excellence in Mali can remove. Founders building a resources or infrastructure business should assume that investors will value their best asset in their worst country at the worst country’s multiple.
The second is that corporate structure is a strategic choice, not a formality. Barrick’s decision to carve out a North American vehicle, settle every outstanding dispute with Newmont and consolidate the Nevada complex before listing shows how much value can sit in simply presenting assets in a form that a particular investor base wants to own. The same principle applies to a software company separating a regulated business from a growth business, or to the conglomerate reorganisations seen at Brookfield.
The third is that a strong balance sheet converts a commodity boom into permanent advantage. Agnico used US$3.3 billion of net cash and an A- rating to buy an entire Finnish district in one quarter while competitors were still repairing leverage; Barrick used US$2.6 billion of disposals to fund buybacks and an IPO. Neither would have been possible for a company that had borrowed heavily at the bottom of the cycle.
The fourth is for governments. Mali recovered roughly US$430 million from Barrick, but it also lost a year of royalties, employment and output at its biggest mine, and it reminded every Toronto-listed explorer why the TSXV prices West African ounces at a discount. The Canadian contrast, where flow-through shares and a predictable permitting regime have kept the capital at home, is the stronger long-run model, and it is one that readers following Australia’s company stories will recognise from Perth.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Barrick still a Canadian company after the name change?
Yes. Barrick Mining Corporation remains incorporated in Canada with its head office in Toronto and its primary listings on the TSX (ABX) and NYSE (B). The 2025 name change reflected its growing copper business, and the planned 2026 IPO of its North American assets would create a second listed company rather than move the parent.
How much did Barrick pay to settle the Mali dispute?
Bloomberg reported a payment of 244 billion CFA francs, roughly US$430 to 436 million, close to the back-tax claim Mali had made. In return Mali dropped proceedings, released four detained employees and returned the Loulo-Gounkoto complex, while Barrick withdrew its ICSID arbitration. Barrick has not published the full terms.
Why are Agnico Eagle’s costs so much lower than Barrick’s?
Agnico’s second-quarter 2026 all-in sustaining cost of US$1,459 per ounce compares with Barrick’s US$1,866. The difference reflects higher grades at Detour Lake and Fosterville, lower security and logistics costs in Canada and Finland, and the absence of the fiscal renegotiations and disruptions that affected Barrick’s African assets in 2025.
What is a flow-through share and who can buy one?
A flow-through share is a Canadian equity instrument through which an exploration company renounces its eligible exploration expenses to the subscriber, who deducts them from personal taxable income and claims a 15 per cent federal credit (30 per cent for listed critical minerals). They are sold mainly to Canadian resident taxpayers through private placements and specialised funds.