In 2017 Vietnam offered solar developers a feed-in tariff of 9.35 US cents per kilowatt-hour for any plant completed by 30 June 2019. The result was the fastest solar build-out Southeast Asia had ever seen: from almost nothing to over 4 gigawatts of utility solar by the deadline, then to roughly 16 gigawatts including rooftop by the end of 2020 after a second tariff window. The grid in Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận could not absorb it, curtailment reached 30 to 40 percent at some plants, a government inspection found the approvals riddled with irregularities, and the tariff was replaced with nothing at all for nearly three years. Vietnam is still living with the consequences.
Vietnam’s solar boom is the best case study anywhere of what happens when a generous tariff meets a grid that was never asked whether it could cope. In under four years the country went from a solar footnote to the largest installed base in Southeast Asia, overtaking Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines combined, and then stopped almost completely. The story involves a deadline-driven construction race, provincial governors competing for projects, Thai utilities buying up plants at a premium, a state grid operator turning off panels at noon, and a corruption investigation that reached a former deputy minister. It is part of the Vietnam Company Stories hub.
What triggered the boom?
Decision 11 of 2017 set a 20-year feed-in tariff of 9.35 US cents per kilowatt-hour for solar plants reaching commercial operation by 30 June 2019, well above the cost of generation, with EVN obliged to buy all the output.
How big did it get?
About 4.5 gigawatts of ground-mounted solar connected in the two years to June 2019, and a second, lower tariff window through the end of 2020 added another wave, including roughly 9 gigawatts of rooftop solar. Total solar capacity passed 16 gigawatts, about a quarter of Vietnam’s installed base.
Why did it stall?
The transmission grid in the sunniest provinces was overloaded, forcing curtailment; the second tariff expired at the end of 2020 with no replacement; and a 2023 government inspection found that many projects had been approved outside the master plan, leading to arrests, withheld payments and a long freeze on new approvals.
Why did Vietnam introduce a solar feed-in tariff in 2017?
The government needed new generation fast, coal projects were slipping behind schedule, and solar module prices had fallen far enough that a fixed tariff of 9.35 cents looked like a manageable way to attract private capital without spending state money. Decision 11/2017 was designed to test the market.
In 2016 and 2017 Vietnam’s power planners were worried. The seventh power development plan relied heavily on new coal plants, many of them to be financed by Japanese and Korean lenders on build-operate-transfer terms, and those projects were routinely years late. Demand was growing at close to 10 percent a year. The Ninh Thuận nuclear programme had just been cancelled. Something had to fill the gap, and the state utility EVN, whose finances are examined in the EVN story, could not fund it alone.
The feed-in tariff was a standard tool by then, used in Germany, Japan and Thailand. What made the Vietnamese version unusual was the combination of a relatively high price, a hard deadline and a template power purchase agreement that obliged EVN to take all output for 20 years. The tariff was set in US dollars and paid in dong at the prevailing rate, which mattered to foreign investors, and there was no cap on the total capacity that could qualify.
Officials expected perhaps 800 megawatts to a gigawatt to come forward. They were off by a factor of five, because they underestimated how quickly module costs were falling and how much land, capital and political appetite existed in the south-central provinces.
How did 4 gigawatts get built in two years?
Developers bought land and grid connection approvals in the sunniest provinces, secured provincial and ministerial approval to be added to the power plan, imported Chinese modules and inverters, and built as fast as the deadline required. Roughly 82 plants totalling about 4.5 gigawatts were connected in the final weeks before 30 June 2019.
The geography concentrated the rush. Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận, two poor coastal provinces with the highest solar irradiation in the country and abundant dry land, became the epicentre. Ninh Thuận alone approved projects totalling more than 2 gigawatts, far more than its provincial grid could carry. Provincial leaders competed to attract projects because each one brought land fees, construction jobs and a story to tell Hanoi about investment attraction.
The developers were a mix. Domestic groups such as Trung Nam, Xuân Thiện, BIM Group, Bamboo Capital and TTC moved first, using their land banks and relationships with provincial authorities. Thai companies — B.Grimm, Super Energy, Gulf Energy, Gunkul and Banpu — arrived with cheaper capital and often bought majority stakes in projects that domestic developers had permitted but could not fully finance. The Philippines’ AC Energy and Singapore’s Sembcorp followed.
Financing was largely domestic bank debt secured against the EVN power purchase agreement, supplemented by Thai corporate balance sheets. The construction supply chain was almost entirely Chinese: modules from JA Solar, Trina and LONGi, inverters from Huawei and Sungrow, and engineering contractors from China who had built at similar speed at home. The deadline made everything more expensive, but the tariff was generous enough to absorb it.
What happened when the grid could not take the power?
By mid-2019 the 110 kV and 220 kV lines in Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận were overloaded, and the system operator began curtailing solar plants, in some cases by 30 to 60 percent of output at midday. Projects that had been financed on the assumption of full offtake suddenly earned far less than modelled.
The grid problem had been predictable. EVN’s transmission subsidiary had a plan for new lines and substations in the region, but it moved on a multi-year state investment timetable while the solar plants were built in months. Under the template power purchase agreement, EVN had no obligation to compensate for curtailment caused by grid constraints, and no obligation to build the grid on any particular schedule. Developers who had assumed the state would keep pace discovered that the contract did not say so.
One developer solved the problem itself. Trung Nam Group, led by Nguyễn Tâm Thịnh, built a 450-megawatt solar plant at Thuận Nam together with a 500 kV substation and a 17-kilometre transmission line, at its own cost, and handed the grid assets to EVN at no charge. It was the first private investment in Vietnam’s 500 kV network and it relieved the bottleneck for the whole province. It also led to a bitter dispute when EVN later stopped paying for a 172-megawatt portion of the plant that it said fell outside the approved capacity, a dispute that ran through the courts and the government for years.
The broader lesson was absorbed slowly. The 2020 tariff decision that followed included language on grid capacity, and the later power plans made grid investment a formal precondition for new renewables. But the plants already built in the first wave continued to face curtailment well into 2022, and some never recovered their modelled returns.
Why did the second tariff window create a rooftop explosion?
Decision 13 of 2020 cut the ground-mounted tariff to 7.09 cents but set the rooftop tariff at 8.38 cents, with a deadline of 31 December 2020 and no formal size limit on what counted as rooftop. Investors responded by building roughly 9 gigawatts of rooftop solar in a single year, much of it on purpose-built sheds.
The rooftop tariff had been intended for households and factories to put panels on existing buildings. What the market built was different: rows of steel-frame structures on agricultural land in the Mekong Delta and central highlands, nominally farms or warehouses, with megawatts of panels on top, connected at medium voltage and registered as clusters of sub-1-megawatt rooftop systems to fit the definition. More than 100,000 rooftop systems were registered by the deadline, and local EVN distribution companies were overwhelmed with connection requests in the final weeks of December.
For the grid, rooftop solar was in some ways harder to manage than utility plants. It connected at distribution level, was invisible to the central dispatcher and could not be curtailed remotely. In the low-demand months of early 2021, with the pandemic suppressing industrial load, the system operator was forced to curtail large hydro and coal plants and to shut down utility solar at midday to keep the system stable while rooftop output flowed in uncontrolled.
The rooftop wave also drew in a new class of investor. Real estate developers, banks and listed companies with no energy experience — some of the same groups whose leverage later surfaced in the Novaland debt crisis — built portfolios to capture the tariff, and some of the aggressive financing behind those portfolios later became a problem when EVN began questioning whether the systems qualified as rooftop at all.
What did the 2023 government inspection find?
The Government Inspectorate’s conclusion, published in late 2023, found that the Ministry of Industry and Trade had added more than 150 solar projects to the power plan without proper basis, that some projects received the 9.35-cent tariff despite not qualifying, and that many plants had been recognised as operational without completed acceptance procedures. Cases were referred to the police.
The inspection had been ordered as part of the broader anti-corruption campaign that has run through Vietnamese state enterprises and ministries since 2016. It examined the entire 2016–2021 planning period for power. Its findings were detailed: projects approved in provinces outside the national plan, tariff eligibility granted to plants in Ninh Thuận beyond the capacity the government had authorised, rooftop definitions stretched beyond recognition, and land converted from agriculture without approval.
The consequences reached the top of the ministry. Hoàng Quốc Vượng, a former deputy minister of industry and trade who had chaired EVN and later Petrovietnam, was arrested in January 2024 in connection with the approval of tariff eligibility for the Trung Nam Thuận Nam project. Several other officials at the ministry and at EVN were prosecuted or disciplined, and provincial leaders in Ninh Thuận and elsewhere were reprimanded. In 2025 the courts handed down prison sentences in the first of these cases.
For investors, the more damaging outcome was administrative. EVN, now able to cite the inspection, began withholding tariff payments from projects whose acceptance paperwork was incomplete, and in 2025 the ministry floated proposals to strip the feed-in tariff retroactively from as many as 170 projects that had been recognised as operational before receiving final construction acceptance. Foreign investors, including Thai, Singaporean and European groups, wrote jointly to the Prime Minister warning that retroactive changes would deter all future investment.
What replaced the feed-in tariff, and why did the market freeze?
Nothing replaced it for almost three years. After the 31 December 2020 deadline, no tariff existed for new solar or wind, and the roughly 85 projects that had missed the deadlines, about 4.7 gigawatts, sat idle until 2023, when the ministry issued a ceiling tariff about 30 to 50 percent below the old feed-in rates.
The stranded projects became a symbol of the freeze. They had been built or nearly built on the expectation of a tariff extension that never came, partly because of the pandemic and partly because the ministry had decided to move to auctions. The auction framework, however, was never finalised. When the transitional ceiling tariff arrived in early 2023, most developers considered it uneconomic, and the negotiations with EVN over individual prices dragged on for months. Many accepted a temporary price at half the ceiling just to start earning something.
The freeze also reflected a genuine change in policy priority. The power plan approved in May 2023, described in the PDP8 story, cut the 2030 target for utility solar back to just under 13 gigawatts, barely above what was already built, on the grounds that the grid could not absorb more and that the intermittent output needed gas and storage to balance it. Solar had gone from the favoured child of energy policy to the problem child in the space of three years.
The pendulum swung back in 2025. The revised plan raised the 2030 solar target to between 46 and 73 gigawatts, driven by the government’s new growth ambitions, and the rules for self-consumption rooftop solar and direct power purchase agreements gave factories a route to build without EVN as offtaker. But the mechanism for utility-scale projects remains a negotiated ceiling price rather than a bankable tariff, and foreign capital has been correspondingly cautious.
Who made money and who lost it?
The clearest winners were early domestic developers who sold to Thai utilities in 2019 and 2020, and the Thai buyers who acquired plants with clean paperwork. The losers were late-deadline builders with incomplete acceptance files, the stranded transitional projects, and the banks that financed rooftop portfolios that EVN later disputed.
The Thai wave was remarkable in scale. By 2021 Thai-listed companies owned or held stakes in an estimated 2 to 3 gigawatts of Vietnamese solar and wind, more than Thailand itself added in the same period. Super Energy alone reported over 800 megawatts in Vietnam. For Thai utilities facing a saturated home market, Vietnam offered growth and a dollar-linked tariff; for Vietnamese developers, Thai capital offered an exit at a valuation domestic buyers could not match. The pattern echoes how ThaiBev bought Sabeco: Thai corporate balance sheets buying Vietnamese growth.
Domestic conglomerates had mixed results. Trung Nam became the country’s largest renewable developer but then faced bond repayment difficulties in 2023 and 2024 as its Thuận Nam payment dispute and the broader property-linked credit squeeze coincided. Bamboo Capital’s energy arm carried heavy debt into the transitional period. Xuân Thiện and BIM emerged in better shape, in part because their projects were fully within the approved plan.
The banks are the least visible casualty. Domestic lenders had extended tens of trillions of dong against feed-in tariff cash flows, and when EVN withheld payment or the tariff came under retroactive challenge, those loans had to be restructured. The State Bank of Vietnam has not published a figure for renewables-related problem loans, but the sector features regularly in bank disclosures of restructured credit.
What does the solar boom teach founders, investors and operators?
The central lesson is that in a state-directed economy, a subsidy is a policy signal that can be reversed, not a contract, and the value of an asset depends on its paperwork surviving the next inspection. Speed, documentation and early exit mattered more than engineering quality.
For developers, the boom showed the value of controlling the grid connection. Trung Nam’s decision to build its own 500 kV substation was expensive but it meant its plant ran when neighbours were curtailed. Projects that assumed the state would build the line on time were wrong, and the same logic now applies to offshore wind and LNG, where the grid corridors are again the binding constraint, as the offshore wind story shows.
For investors, the boom showed that the counterparty is the whole country, not EVN alone. The power purchase agreement was signed by EVN, but the tariff eligibility was granted by the ministry, the land by the province, and the acceptance certificate by a construction authority, and a failure in any of those files could void the economics years later. Foreign buyers who paid premiums for portfolios in 2020 have since discovered that the chain of approvals was the asset, and the panels were incidental.
For policymakers, the lesson has been partly learned. The 2024 Electricity Law and the 2025 decrees emphasise grid readiness, auctions and self-consumption rather than open-ended tariffs. But Vietnam still needs tens of gigawatts of new solar by 2030 to meet its own targets, and it will need to persuade the same investors it burned in 2021 to return. The credibility of the state as an offtaker is now the main constraint on the country’s energy transition.
Frequently Asked Questions
How much solar capacity does Vietnam have?
Roughly 18 to 19 gigawatts of installed solar as of 2024, of which about 9 gigawatts is rooftop, making Vietnam the largest solar market in Southeast Asia by installed base. Almost all of it was built between 2018 and 2020 under two feed-in tariff windows; very little utility solar has been added since.
What was the Vietnam solar feed-in tariff?
Decision 11/2017 set 9.35 US cents per kilowatt-hour for 20 years for plants operating by 30 June 2019. Decision 13/2020 then set 7.09 cents for ground-mounted, 7.69 cents for floating and 8.38 cents for rooftop solar operating by 31 December 2020. No tariff has been offered for new utility solar since, apart from a negotiated ceiling price for transitional projects.
Why was Vietnamese solar curtailed?
Because the transmission lines in Ninh Thuận and Bình Thuận, where most plants were built, could not carry the combined output at midday, and because system-wide demand fell during the pandemic while uncontrollable rooftop output surged. EVN’s standard power purchase agreement does not compensate generators for curtailment caused by grid constraints.
Is it still possible to invest in solar in Vietnam?
Yes, but the route has changed. Self-consumption rooftop projects for factories and direct power purchase agreements with large consumers are now the most active segments, while utility-scale projects depend on being included in the revised power plan and negotiating a price with EVN under a ceiling. The 2025 plan targets a large increase in solar by 2030, so the policy signal is positive; the offtake mechanism is the uncertainty.