Tourism Holdings (thl): How a Helicopter Firm Became the World’s Campervan Giant

thl is a capital-recycling machine disguised as a holiday company: it builds or buys motorhomes, rents them to tourists for a few years and sells them, and its profit depends on doing all three well at once. That model has made a business founded to fly helicopters over glaciers into the largest operator in a global niche, and has now drawn two prospective acquirers. This article explains how thl got here, how the rental-and-resale cycle earns money, what the Apollo merger changed, why North America has been the weak spot and what the takeover contest means. It is part of the New Zealand Company Stories hub.

How did Tourism Holdings start?

Tourism Holdings was founded in 1984 as The Helicopter Line, a scenic-flight operator in New Zealand’s South Island, and listed on the stock exchange in 1986. It became a tourism conglomerate in the 1990s and narrowed to campervans after 2007.

The early company was a child of the 1980s share boom. It bought attractions the way investment companies of the period bought anything: coach lines, the Milford Sound Red Boats, Kelly Tarlton’s aquarium in Auckland, the Waitomo glow-worm caves operation and the Maui campervan rental business. By the late 1990s, renamed Tourism Holdings Limited, it owned a slice of most things an international visitor to New Zealand would pay for.

Breadth did not produce returns. Between 2007 and 2009 the company sold the boats, the aquarium, the coach lines and several other units, and the chief executive departed. Grant Webster, who took over in that period and still runs the company, kept the part with scale economics and international reach: motorhome rental, with its own vehicle manufacturing. Two small tourism businesses survived the cull, the Kiwi Experience backpacker bus and Discover Waitomo, and they remain in the group.

How does thl make money from campervans?

thl earns rental income from a vehicle for roughly three to five years and then sells it through its own dealerships. Profit comes from the daily rental yield, the utilisation rate and the gap between a vehicle’s depreciated book value and its resale price.

The economics resemble aircraft leasing more than hospitality. A motorhome is an expensive asset that earns little in winter and a great deal in summer, so the operator must manage yield across seasons and hemispheres. thl tracks revenue per average rental vehicle; in FY2026 that figure was about NZ$58,000, up 1%. The rental fleet grew by an average of 11.5% over the year, which is why rental revenue rose 11% to NZ$517.5m.

The back end matters as much. When a vehicle leaves the rental fleet it is refurbished and sold to a private buyer. In a strong used-vehicle market the company books a gain on top of years of rental income; in a weak one it must either accept less or keep ageing vehicles on the fleet. The group also manufactures motorhomes, now consolidated in Hamilton, and sells new recreational vehicles through dealerships, including Winnebago-branded models in Australasia.

Brands segment the market by price. Maui and KEA sit at the premium end, Britz and Apollo in the middle, and Mighty, Cheapa and Hippie serve budget travellers, often with older vehicles cascaded down from the premium fleets. In North America the brands are Road Bear, El Monte RV and CanaDream.

Why did thl merge with Apollo?

thl merged with Apollo Tourism & Leisure in November 2022 to combine the two largest campervan rental fleets in Australia and New Zealand, add Apollo’s Canadian arm and extract cost savings. Apollo shareholders received thl shares amounting to about a quarter of the merged company.

Apollo was founded in Brisbane in 1985 by the Trouchet family and listed on the ASX in 2016. It was thl’s mirror image: the same model, the same markets, a similar mix of rental, manufacturing and retail. Covid-19 hurt both, since fleets built for international tourists sat idle behind closed borders, and consolidation offered a way to repair two damaged balance sheets with one set of depots.

Competition regulators on both sides of the Tasman were wary. To obtain clearance from the Commerce Commission and the ACCC, thl agreed to sell 310 motorhomes and the Star RV brand to the smaller rival Jucy, strengthening a third player. The deal closed on 30 November 2022 and thl added an ASX listing alongside its NZX one. Luke Trouchet, Apollo’s chief executive, joined thl as an executive director. The merged company’s first full year, FY2023, produced a record net profit of about NZ$50m as pent-up travel demand met a shortage of rental vehicles.

How did thl expand into North America?

thl entered the United States by buying Road Bear RV in 2010 and El Monte RV in December 2016, the latter for about US$65m, making it the second-largest RV rental operator in the country behind Cruise America. The Apollo merger added CanaDream in Canada.

North America is the world’s largest recreational-vehicle market, and the logic of applying a proven rental-and-resale model there was sound. For some years it worked: in 2021 and 2022 American buyers paid extraordinary prices for used RVs and the business made large gains on fleet sales.

It then became the group’s problem. The American RV retail market slumped as interest rates rose, leaving dealers overstocked and used prices falling. thl could not sell ex-rental vehicles at the values it had assumed, and in FY2025 the group reported a statutory loss of NZ$14.1m after writing down assets. In FY2026 the North American division earned a return on funds employed of just 0.5%, an improvement on a negative result but far short of the group’s 15% target. Trade policy added friction: tariffs between the United States and Canada raised the cost of moving vehicles and dampened cross-border travel, a theme explored in the article on New Zealand and the 2025 US tariffs.

Who owns thl, and who is trying to buy it?

thl is a widely held listed company whose largest shareholder is a consortium of the Melbourne private-equity firm BGH Capital and the Trouchet family, with about 19.9%. That consortium has offered NZ$3.10 a share, and a second, unnamed strategic party has indicated NZ$3.30 to NZ$3.40.

The contest began in June 2025, when BGH and the family interests of Luke and Karl Trouchet proposed to buy the company at NZ$2.30 a share in cash, valuing its equity at about NZ$471m. BGH had built its stake by buying on market from institutions including ANZ’s New Zealand funds arm and the Accident Compensation Corporation. Luke Trouchet stepped aside from his executive duties, and a committee of independent directors took charge. The board did not accept that the price reflected fair value and the approach lapsed.

The consortium returned in late May 2026 and, by 12 June, had lifted its indicative price to NZ$3.10, about 35% above the first offer and equivalent to roughly NZ$635m for the equity. Shareholders holding about 16% told the board they supported opening the books, and the board granted due diligence on the basis that any binding bid would be at NZ$3.10 or more. On 25 June the company disclosed a further non-binding indication at NZ$3.30 to NZ$3.40 from what it called a credible strategic buyer, also given access.

When thl reported its annual result in late August 2026, due diligence with both parties was continuing and expected to run for about six more weeks. The board stressed that no decision had been made and that neither proposal might lead to a transaction. Any deal would probably proceed by scheme of arrangement and would require an independent adviser’s report, shareholder approval and competition and overseas-investment clearances.

What do the FY2026 results show?

In the year to 30 June 2026 thl reported underlying net profit after tax of NZ$46.1m, up 34%, and statutory net profit of NZ$39.9m against a NZ$14.1m loss the year before. Total revenue fell 5% to NZ$852.9m because fewer vehicles were sold.

The split between the two revenue lines tells the story. Rental income rose 11% as the fleet grew to 8,587 vehicles, 10% more than a year earlier. Vehicle sales fell as retail markets stayed weak and as thl left loss-making activities: it closed two unprofitable Australian dealerships and, on 31 March 2026, completed the sale of its United Kingdom and Ireland business for about NZ$57m.

New Zealand remained the most reliable earner, with rentals and sales EBIT up 9% to NZ$52.7m; Australian underlying EBIT rose 32%. The small tourism division, which needs little capital, posted the highest return on funds employed in the group. Group return on funds employed improved to 8.7% from 7.6%. Leverage fell to 2.32 times earnings from 2.99 times. Management kept its long-standing goal of NZ$100m of underlying net profit but gave no date for reaching it.

Who competes with thl?

Competitors differ by country. In the United States the leader is Cruise America; in Australasia the main rivals are Jucy, Wilderness and a long tail of small operators; everywhere, peer-to-peer platforms such as Camplify and Outdoorsy let private owners rent out their vehicles.

In New Zealand and Australia thl is by some distance the largest operator, which is why regulators required the Jucy divestment. Barriers to entry are modest at the bottom of the market, where anyone can convert a van, and substantial at the top, where airport depots, a manufacturing line, a resale channel and relationships with European and American travel wholesalers take years to build.

The less visible competition is from other kinds of holiday. A motorhome trip competes with a rental car plus hotels, with cruises and with staying home. When international airfares rise or airline capacity shrinks, as happened to the national carrier described in the article on Air New Zealand, fewer long-haul visitors arrive to rent. European and North American tourists on long trips are thl’s best customers, which ties the company to the pace of the recovery covered in the article on New Zealand tourism after Covid.

What are the main risks in the thl model?

The main risks are falling resale values, weak inbound tourism, high debt relative to a cyclical earnings stream and fuel prices. Each affects both sides of the business: the rental yield and the price achieved when the vehicle is sold.

Residual value is the most technical. thl depreciates each vehicle toward an assumed sale price. If the used market falls, as it did in North America, the gap appears as lower sale margins or as a write-down. Because vehicles are funded largely with debt, a prolonged slump squeezes cash at the moment lenders are most attentive.

Demand shocks are the most visible. The company warned in mid-2026 that conflict in the Middle East was disrupting long-haul travel and that FY2027 earnings would be dampened by that and by slow vehicle sales. Fuel prices matter twice, raising airfares to reach New Zealand and the cost of driving a three-tonne vehicle around it. Against that, recent forward bookings were strong: management said intake in recent weeks was up about 40% in New Zealand, 15% in Australia and 45% in the United States.

Why does thl’s listing matter to the New Zealand market?

It matters because thl is one of a shrinking number of mid-sized, internationally active companies on the NZX. A sale to private equity or an offshore trade buyer would remove another, continuing a pattern of delistings that worries the exchange and local fund managers.

Since the Apollo merger thl has been listed in both Wellington and Sydney, reflecting a shareholder base and an operating footprint that are substantially Australian. Bids for New Zealand companies at large premiums to depressed share prices have become frequent, and directors face the awkward task of weighing a certain cash price against a recovery they believe in but cannot guarantee. The broader trend is set out in the article on the NZX and its shrinking market.

For shareholders the arithmetic is simple enough. A price of NZ$3.30 would be 43% above the NZ$2.30 the board declined a year earlier. For the market, the loss would be a company that designs and builds vehicles in Hamilton, employs staff in four countries and reports in New Zealand dollars.

What can founders and CFOs learn from thl?

The central lesson is that an asset-heavy business is really three businesses: buying the asset, earning on it and selling it. thl’s best years came when all three aligned and its worst when the resale leg failed.

• Focus beats breadth. Selling boats, aquariums and coaches in 2007 to 2009 left a smaller company with a model that could be replicated abroad.
• Own the exit channel. Running its own dealerships lets thl capture the retail margin on ex-rental vehicles instead of handing it to wholesalers, though it also means carrying inventory in a downturn.
• Measure return on funds employed, not profit. A fleet business can grow profit simply by adding debt-funded vehicles. thl’s 15% target and its 8.7% outcome show where capital is and is not earning its keep.
• Merge with your mirror, and expect remedies. The Apollo deal delivered savings, but only after ceding fleet and a brand to a rival. Model the divestment before announcing the deal.
• A low share price is an invitation. After the FY2025 loss, a shareholder with inside knowledge of the industry bid at NZ$2.30. Twelve months and a profit recovery later the indicative price was more than 40% higher.

What happens next for thl?

The immediate question is whether either suitor makes a binding offer. Due diligence was expected to finish around early October 2026, after which the board must decide whether to recommend a scheme, seek a higher price or continue as an independent company.

If a deal is agreed, completion would take several months. The identity of the strategic party matters: a trade buyer with its own rental or manufacturing operations could face competition scrutiny in one or more countries, while the BGH consortium’s existing 19.9% stake gives it influence over any rival scheme. If no deal emerges, the share price will depend again on execution, particularly in North America.

The operating plan does not change either way. Management intends to keep growing the rental fleet, where returns are best, hold back on vehicle sales until retail markets recover, and extract further savings from consolidated manufacturing. A new Queenstown site opened in August 2026, and the redesigned Winnebago range is in dealerships. Queenstown is also where another tourism group in this series, SkyCity Entertainment, operates. Whoever owns thl a year from now will hold the same thing: a very large fleet of vehicles whose value depends on how many people still want to see the world slowly, through a windscreen.

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