by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Competition & Antitrust, Digital Markets Regulation
⚡ TL;DRTwo years into enforcement, the DMA has produced its first fines (Apple €500 million for steering restrictions, Meta €200 million over pay-or-consent), engineering-level specification decisions on Apple interoperability, retargeted investigations...
by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Competition & Antitrust, Digital Markets Regulation
⚡ TL;DRThe EU Digital Markets Act regulates “gatekeepers” — platforms with €7.5 billion+ EEA turnover (or €75 billion market value), 45 million+ monthly EU users and 10,000+ yearly business users — through per-se obligations: no...
by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Abuse of Dominance, Competition & Antitrust
⚡ TL;DRExclusivity, tying and loyalty rebates are the dominant firm’s classic distribution weapons — and the most frequently condemned abuse category. Exclusive dealing forecloses rivals from customers; tying leverages a must-have product into a contested...
by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Abuse of Dominance, Competition & Antitrust
⚡ TL;DRDominant firms are generally free to choose their trading partners — but the freedom ends where an input is indispensable and refusal eliminates downstream competition. The EU’s essential-facilities line (Magill, Bronner, Microsoft, Slovak Telekom) orders...
by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Abuse of Dominance, Competition & Antitrust
⚡ TL;DRPredatory pricing is a dominant firm pricing below cost to eliminate rivals and recoup later: below average variable/avoidable cost is presumed abusive (AKZO), between AVC and average total cost it is abusive with exclusionary intent, and US law adds a strict...
by Ekrem Duman | Aug 26, 2026 | Abuse of Dominance, Competition & Antitrust
⚡ TL;DRMarket definition sets the denominator of every share figure, and dominance assessment tests whether that share equals real power. The tools: demand-side substitutability probed by the SSNIP (hypothetical monopolist) test, supply-side substitution, geographic...
